According to neuroscience literature, defining consciousness presents both a hard and easy problem. Actually, there isn’t a hard or easy problem. The issue is culture, and what is hidden underneath the term consciousness. So let’s speak about its meaning. It has numerous connotations, including ancient philosophical and theological ones that challenge science’s materialism. All of these cultural connotations lead scientists astray because they lack tangible facts. Yes, it is beneficial to view a situation from above with big pictures and broad perspectives: this is the strength of human intelligence. No, it is not good to put the cart before the horses trying to solve “hard” problems before easy ones.
Furthermore, the concept of consciousness rests on principles from the Age of Enlightenment, in which humans are said to master reason and have free will, as opposed to animals who are entirely governed by their emotions. As a result, we associate consciousness with these hitherto unrecognized human skills, further complicating the situation. As with many scientific questions, if a solution is poorly designed, it is because the query is inadequate. The simple answer for why it is a difficult problem is because there is no way to grasp materiality with such a high-level functional topic. The sole remaining option is that consciousness can only be explained in terms of non-materialistic characteristics such as mind, soul, or God. Long live dualism with that type of logic, especially if it is propagated by scientists.
Indeed, there is no “hard” problem; only a wrong problem, which begins with a lousy query. There is no single, precise definition of consciousness. This is not science; it is simply beliefs and culture, and it combines Cartesian reason with emotion. However, in our instance, the essential point regarding consciousness is that neuroscience is not yet a hard science (like math and physics or coding). The term consciousness has a history, and when used in science, it carries all of its cultural connotations with it. As a result, it isn’t truly scientific. This approach complicates the problem by viewing the situation from above with no relationship to the real at a low level, and no bootstrap to launch the recursion of the meta level. But, regardless, let’s look at some consciousness concepts.
One definition of consciousness is self-awareness: I understand who I am and why I am alive. I know that my thoughts are unique to me. I am more than just an automated automaton; I have a “reflection” on myself, can recognize myself in the mirror, and can think about who I am and what I am doing. It is like a mise-en-abyme when an actor sees themself in the play they are acting in. This type of reasoning, known as metaprogramming, is widely used in object-oriented languages.
One might define consciousness more simply as well. An animal that is basic enough to be compared to a simple automaton is capable of responding to events in terms of patterns even when it is unaware of the cause of the event. For instance, a worm will respond to a pinch in accordance with its patterns without realizing what is happening. A less basic animal, such as a mammal, on the other hand, might have a representation of what is causing its response, such as a predator and the kind of predator. Clearly, considerably more intricate patterns exist to depict the world—both within and outside—and distinguish between the various reasons why an event might have occurred. The truth is that our understanding of this faculty’s implementation in even simple animals’ Central Nervous Systems (CNS) is very limited. Furthermore, a large number of scientists are still interested in discussing the far more intricate subject of the human mind. Hopefully, other ones are looking into the CNS and animal emotions to learn more about initially simpler creatures.
However, we can concentrate on the “easy” problem, which has tangible hints and well-established facts. We can build upon the foundation by beginning there. This is not the “easy” way to continue; rather, it is the “hard”, lengthy and difficult route. This is the method without making use of outdated ideas that have existed from the beginning of humankind. With the additional data on humans, animals, and information theory that science has provided, we need to either improve upon or discard some of these antiquated ideas. To break free from culture, which keeps us stuck in the past and leads us nowhere, we must think creatively.
I therefore want to introduce a fresh perspective on consciousness, limiting it to body consciousness, and reframing ordinary consciousness in terms of intelligence and cognition. With body consciousness arises the “hard” problem of consciousness and its relationship to emotions, making it a body problem rather than a structuring and processing of information problem. Anybody in full health should be able to act on their body at will, particularly by contracting or relaxing their muscles.
It refers to any muscle that a typical person is conscious of. In this sense, yoga can be understood as a means of strengthening body consciousness via practice and willpower. This method of thinking enables me to consider consciousness and will as a faculty that may be more closely associated with the body than the CNS. By adopting this new perspective, we may be able to redefine consciousness more effectively by bringing it into closer contact with the materiality of emotions and our animal self, the body. I believe we may solve the enigma of what we mistakenly refer to as consciousness, free will, intellect, intelligence, emotions, etc. by following this long and difficult “easy” road.
This approach is more Cartesian in that it casts doubt on everything, breaks consciousness down into manageable chunks, starts with the “easy” solution, and aims to address the underlying root of the mind-body problem. It is the path that all scientists ought to take, refraining from developing complicated ideas that are not based in the materiality of the real. The body, including the central nervous system, is real, not the mind. For this reason, I am an eliminative materialist neurophilosopher who pleads for bodily philosophy.
—
References about neuroscience and metaprogramming in this article: Jaak Pankseep, Antonio Damasio and Jacques Ferber.